VA Repossession Laws

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Virginia Repossession Laws

§ 8.9A-609. Secured party's right to take possession after default.

(a) Possession; rendering equipment unusable; disposition on debtor's premises. After default, a secured party:

(1) may take possession of the collateral; and

(2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor's premises under § 8.9A-610.

(b) Judicial and no non-judicial process. A secured party may proceed under subsection (a):

(1) pursuant to judicial process; or

(2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.

(c) Assembly of collateral. If so agreed, and in any event after default, a secured party may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient to both parties.

(1964, c. 219, § 8.9-503; 2000, c. 1007.)

Creditors may enter on to the debtor’s land to repossess the collateral because the vindication of the creditor’s security interest is considered more important than a trespass. If, however, the debtor is present and makes an objection, the breach of the peace analysis comes to the fore: the creditor’s agent must then desist. Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 742 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. VA 1990).

When conduct constitutes breach of the peace. — Breach of the peace refers to conduct at or near and/or incident to the seizure of the property. Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 742 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. VA 1990).

Once a creditor has gained sufficient dominion over his collateral, objection by the debtor will be of no avail. Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 742 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. VA 1990).

Permissible conduct — The repossession of movable collateral such as cars from property owned by a third party or from a public place cannot amount to a breach of the peace (unless there is opposition to the removal). This is because the debtor’s real property interest is not invaded. Wallace v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 742 F. Supp. 1228 (W.D. VA 1990).